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[Excerpt] To elaborate on each of these points, the findings presented in this book can be summarized as
follows. First of all, the German model, that is, a social partnership approach to the negotiation of terms and
conditions for the organization of an advanced market economy has worked in the past. We believe, on the
basis of extensive collective research on different aspects of the political economy of the Federal Republic,
both before and after unification, that the preservation of a reformed social partnership in Germany is highly
desirable as an alternative to less regulated forms of capitalism in the contemporary world economy. Thus we
disagree rather sharply with both conservative and liberal analysts who see the social market economy as an
expensive and outdated relic of a welfare-state past.
The evidence presented in this book also shows not only that social partnership is desirable but that it remains
relatively intact. We have identified problems that must be solved for this to continue to be the case, but
whatever the future holds, the basic institutions and practices of social partnership have been transferred into
eastern Germany and continue to characterize political-economic relations in unified Germany. This remains
true even in the face of major challenges presented by European integration, intensified global competition, a
rapidly appreciating deutschmark, market imperatives for production reorganization (driven by Japanese-style
lean production), and escalating collective bargaining conflict. Both employer associations and unions
continue to play pattern-setting roles in wage negotiations, to set the framework for firm-level
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Conclusion: Uncertain Outcomes of 
Conflict and Negotiation 
Lowell Turner 
W h e r e d o e s all this leave us? There are some things we can 
say with reasonable certainty, with consensus at least among the authors of 
this volume. Social partnership as a framework for the regulation of a 
market economy has in the past been considerably successful, in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and elsewhere, in terms of both economic results and 
workplace democracy.1 Although in the wake of German unification and 
other global market challenges, social partnership in Germany finds itself in 
crisis, all is not lost. With varying degrees of optimism, the authors of this 
book agree that reform and adaptation are possible, starting from existing 
institutions, given appropriate actor strategies aimed at both institutional 
reform and innovative policy. Much depends not only on innovative strat-
egy but also on the outcomes of conflict and negotiation among key actors 
in business, labor, and government. This is, therefore, a moment of great 
uncertainty, of possibly decisive historical contingency, when alternative 
scenarios are possible. The openness and pivotal nature of future outcomes 
for a unified Germany are points on which both historical institutionalists 
(who emphasize the shaping power of institutions and their constraints) 
and political constructionists (who emphasize political processes of conflict 
and negotiation) can agree.2 
i . For other cases of enduring and successful social partnership, consider, for example, 
Austria (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) and Denmark (Dues, Jensen, and Jesper 1994). 
2. See Locke and Thelen 1995 and forthcoming for a useful theoretical presentation of the 
contrasting perspectives of historical institutionalists and political constructionists in the social 
sciences—as well as the possibilities for mutual learning and synthesis. 
2-55 
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To elaborate on each of these points, the findings presented in this book 
can be summarized as follows. First of all, the German model, that is, a 
social partnership approach to the negotiation of terms and conditions for 
the organization of an advanced market economy has worked in the past.3 
We believe, on the basis of extensive collective research on different aspects 
of the political economy of the Federal Republic, both before and after 
unification, that the preservation of a reformed social partnership in Ger-
many is highly desirable as an alternative to less regulated forms of capital-
ism in the contemporary world economy. Thus we disagree rather sharply 
with both conservative and liberal analysts who see the social market econ-
omy as an expensive and outdated relic of a welfare-state past.4 
The evidence presented in this book also shows not only that social 
partnership is desirable but that it remains relatively intact. We have identi-
fied problems that must be solved for this to continue to be the case, but 
whatever the future holds, the basic institutions and practices of social 
partnership have been transferred into eastern Germany and continue to 
characterize political-economic relations in unified Germany. This remains 
true even in the face of major challenges presented by European integration, 
intensified global competition, a rapidly appreciating deutschmark, market 
imperatives for production reorganization (driven by Japanese-style lean 
production), and escalating collective bargaining conflict. Both employer 
associations and unions continue to play pattern-setting roles in wage nego-
tiations, to set the framework for firm-level codetermination, and to engage 
in national, regional, and local negotiations over important aspects of eco-
nomic and labor-market policy. 
The authors also agree, however, that these combined pressures have been 
exceptionally strong in the 1990s and pose major challenges for the survival 
of the German model. Although the doomsayers of the 1970s and 1980s 
turned out to be wrong, failure appears well within the range of plausible 
outcomes in the coming years. None of the following, for example, are 
inconceivable under present and future circumstances: (1) that large num-
bers of small and medium-sized firms could leave the employer associations, 
rendering collective bargaining and other social partner-negotiated out-
comes less and less comprehensive; (2) that employer associations could 
continue and even intensify their attacks on union influence, both un-
dermining the unions and destabilizing the social partnership; (3) that by 
3. For a comprehensive pre-unification analysis that reaches a similar conclusion concerning 
the viability of negotiated adjustment, see Katzenstein 1989. For a concise post-unification 
analysis in the same vein, see Goodhart 1994. 
4. See, for example, a steady stream of rather one-sided editorials in the Wall Street Journal 
of recent years. 
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failing to resolve internal East-West and other tensions and by failing to 
develop appropriate strategies to organize the growing ranks of white-collar 
professional, technical, and service workers, unions will eventually begin to 
lose major collective bargaining conflicts (as they have so far avoided doing) 
and will embark on an irreversible and prolonged decline in membership 
density; and (4) that because of conservatism or paralyzing conflict, employ-
ers, unions, and government, together or singly, will fail to find adequate 
solutions to particular pressing problems such as technology innovation, 
production reorganization, long-term unemployment, vocational training 
reform, and macroeconomic policy demands. Any of these problems, if 
unsolved, could reach crisis proportions and result in a serious weakening 
of the German social partnership. 
Even the most pessimistic among us, however, believe that it is within the 
capacities of the social partners to solve such problems. Successful adapta-
tion, we contend, lies within the range of choice set by institutions and the 
possibilities for institutional reform. This conviction runs contrary to more 
pessimistic analyses that identify or predict the decline of German unions 
and/or the social partnership under almost any foreseeable scenario (Mahn-
kopf 1991 and 1993; Streeck 1991 and 1997). Our findings concerning 
the past performance and flexibility of German institutions of bargaining, 
coupled with the perception that contemporary actors do have meaningful 
choices to make, lead us away from such hopelessness. Precisely because the 
institutions are flexible, because they allow regularized and complementary 
bargaining ranging from national, regional, and local-level policymaking 
processes, to comprehensive collective bargaining, to firm and plant-level 
negotiated codetermination, their capacity to solve new problems is strong. 
This does not mean they will solve these problems, but our analyses lead us 
to believe that solutions to the problems we have identified lie within the 
capacities of existing institutions, either as they are or as they could be 
reformed by contemporary actors. 
Three examples, in addition to the evidence already presented throughout 
this book, illustrate how actor strategies and reform efforts are addressing 
contemporary challenges. First, as both Herrigel and Wever have argued, 
input and negotiation need to move in a more regularized way from the 
"functional level" down to the point of production. Astute and experienced 
analysts of German industrial relations, Walther Miiller-Jentsch and Hans-
Joachim Sperling (1995) suggest that this is precisely what is happening in 
German firms today; so much so in fact that the dual system (collective 
bargaining and codetermination) is evolving into a flexible "triple system," 
one that includes greatly expanded employee participation in daily, ongoing 
workplace decision making. Whether such negotiation can solve the major 
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problems of reorganization that Herrigel and Wever identify remains to be 
seen, but the shifting locus of negotiation indicates a fundamental institu-
tional reform that makes such adaptation possible. 
Another example is afforded by the increasing openness of IG Metall to 
bargaining innovations (such as flexibility in working hours and corres-
ponding compensation) as well as the escalation of internal reform efforts 
within this most important of German unions. On June 15-16, 1995, for 
example, IG Metall invited academic speakers Wolfgang Streeck, Horst 
Kern, and Klaus Offe to a two-day workshop led by the union's top two 
leaders (Klaus Zwickel and Walther Riester), to speak openly about serious 
problems facing the German labor movement. With a focus on the develop-
ment of a process of internal organizational development (Organisations-
Entwicklung), IG Metallers engaged in active debate and discussed openly 
the problems identified by their guest speakers. At least two principal inno-
vations in union thinking point toward possible adaptation of the sort that 
our research indicates is necessary: (1) a growing commitment to rank-and-
file participation, both at the workplace and in the life of the union; and (2) a 
growing openness to a more flexible menu of alternative, firm-level bar-
gaining outcomes (within a comprehensive collective bargaining framework). 
A final example can be seen in current internal reform processes within 
the metalworking employers' federation, Gesamtmetall. This is particularly 
salient in the wake of the 1995 bargaining round. Both inside and outside 
the organization, Gesamtmetall leadership was widely perceived to have 
made a series of bargaining blunders that contributed to a (perhaps unneces-
sary) strike in Bavaria, massive worker/union solidarity, and a clear union 
victory in the final settlement. Internal criticism and leadership changes 
resulting from the 1995 fiasco may well lead to (1) a better awareness of 
the dubious wisdom of a strategy that aims to defeat IG Metall and (2) 
innovative and flexible strategies that aim toward realistic compromise to 
better serve the interests of employer association membership. This conclu-
sion was reinforced by an important IG Metall victory in the sick-pay 
dispute of fall 1996 and the subsequent contract settlements of 1996-97. 
If necessary reform and adaptation are within the range of institutional 
possibility, then the critical variable becomes actor strategy, along with the 
outcomes of conflict and negotiation among major actors. Strategies, of 
course, are limited both by broader economic circumstances (such as the 
appreciation of the deutschmark, which may price some German products 
out of world markets no matter how extensive firm-level reform may be) and 
by institutional constraints. Not all things are possible. Within the limits of 
circumstance and structure, however, actor strategies become decisive. 
Here we reach the frontiers of contemporary social science research. We 
know much more about institutions, their development and consequences, 
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than we do about the political processes that lead actors to choose certain 
strategies at the expense of others and that result in the resolution of conflict 
and negotiation.5 We know that actor strategies are in part shaped by the 
institutional framework (Hall 1986); but we also know that actor choices 
are shaped by interests, identities, and leadership decisions not entirely 
determined by the institutions.6 Obviously, actors make their own choices 
in part in response to initiatives taken by other actors. What we do not 
know, however, is how these and other factors combine to determine the 
choices that an employers' association or labor union will make in a given 
situation. Nor can we necessarily predict the outcomes of conflict and nego-
tiation from actor interests, identities, the institutional framework, or even 
the conflicting choices that actors might make. Too much depends on the 
uncertain and often surprisingly unpredictable political processes of conflict 
and negotiation. 
Thus we end up humbled not only by the sometimes contradictory yet 
equally persuasive analyses presented in this book and elsewhere but also 
by the most fundamental limits to our ability to predict the future—and 
especially to predict the choices that even well-organized human agents will 
make and the complicated means by which they will resolve their differences 
among themselves and with other equally organized human agents. 
Although we cannot predict the future (this luxury is reserved for those 
who extrapolate from the past, and they are quite often wrong), proponents 
of social partnership in a prosperous and democratically stable unified Ger-
many can take heart from this analysis. While the challenges are severe, the 
institutions have so far demonstrated a basic resilience. Continuing reform, 
as we have seen, is essential to the post-unification vitality of the German 
model. Prospects for successful adaptation and reform now reside squarely 
in the hands of key, well-organized actors in German business, labor, and 
government. The adaptation of social partnership to the most challenging 
circumstances of the late twentieth century and beyond is quite possibly 
within their grasp, but so is the failure of adaptation and the decline of 
social partnership. 
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